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1994-05-02
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<text>
<title>
Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement: Faster, More Open
</title>
<article>
<hdr>
Facing Reality: The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex
Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement: Faster, More Open
</hdr>
<body>
<p>by Tom A. Zamora
</p>
<p> With the end of the Cold War, the arms race has shifted into
reverse. Recent U.S. initiatives would reduce the nuclear
arsenal by at least 70 percent, from 21,000 weapons in 1990 to
6,300 weapons or fewer. (General Colin Powell, Defense
Department Budget Briefing, Jan. 29, 1992, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), p. 11. Russian
President Boris Yeltsin has called for cuts to about 2500
weapons.) According to DOE, dismantling the withdrawn weapons
will take through the year 2000. Warhead dismantlement is thus
setting the pace for disarmament in the United States--and the
Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.). But it would be
better to disable these weapons more rapidly while the political
motivation is strong.
</p>
<p> Verification is the key to giving all parties confidence in
arms agreements, and to avoiding ambiguities later, when
supposedly dismantled weapons will outnumber those left
deployed.
</p>
<p> Dismantling nuclear weapons is nothing new for DOE. Weapons
are routinely dismantled after retirement to salvage their
nuclear materials for reuse in new weapons. The Complex has
produced more than 60,000 weapons, of which about 40,000 have
been retired, dismantled, and recycled.
</p>
<p> The weapons complex, however, has never faced the formidable
task of dismantling so many weapons so quickly. During fiscal
year 1987, for example, the complex dismantled 280 weapons at
its Pantex plant near Amarillo, Texas. To meet the post-Cold
War demand, by 1993 DOE plans to increase capacity at Pantex to
2,000 warheads per year. ("Responses to Questions Regarding
Dismantlement and Pantex," letter from Energy Secretary James
Watkins to Senator Carl Levin, February 24, 1992.) At this rate
DOE could get down to a 6,000-weapon arsenal by 1999.
Meanwhile, there are several steps the United States can take
to ensure that the disarmament rate is not limited by the
capacity of one plant, and that the former Soviet republics also
rapidly disarm.
</p>
<p>A new dismantlement policy
</p>
<p> The first step in this direction would be for the
Administration to announce that all withdrawn warheads will be
dismantled. There is now no such assurance, although certain
tactical weapons have been slated for destruction.
</p>
<p> Secondly, the dismantlement process could be sped up by
retiring and disarming weapons in larger numbers than can be
dismantled each year at Pantex. Such weapons could be separated
from their delivery vehicles (missiles, aircraft, etc.) and
otherwise rendered inoperable. Disabled warheads and bombs
could then be sealed with tamper-proof tags in special
containers, and kept in storage facilities open to bilateral or
international inspection. In this way the C.I.S. would have
confidence that the weapons were not redeployed. U.S. inspectors
could conduct similar verification activities in Russia.
</p>
<p> The U.S., however, has no plans to conduct its dismantlement
operations verifiably. Under the INF and START treaties,
neither the U.S. nor the former USSR is required to dismantle
its warheads. In his September 1991 arms initiative President
Bush proposed "joint technical cooperation on the safe and
environmentally responsible storage, transport, dismantling,
and destruction of nuclear warheads," but he did not explain
how this destruction would be verified.
</p>
<p> In addition to ensuring that weapons have been adequately
stored and disabled, the dismantlement process itself could be
subject to inspection. In the U.S., however, this would require
either the modification of existing facilities or the
construction of a new facility designed to be open to inspection
without revealing sensitive warhead information. Decisions about
those matters should result from a broad-based public debate of
the alternatives.
</p>
<p>The problem with pits
</p>
<p> U.S. warheads are considered dismantled once they have been
broken down to their individual parts. This dangerous process
must be done carefully to limit exposures to workers. All
non-nuclear components (such as electronics and conventional
explosives) are destroyed or reused. Tritium is sent to the
Savannah River Site in South Carolina or the Mound Plant in Ohio
for reuse in weapons. Highly-enriched uranium (HEU) is sent to
the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for processing and
storage. And the plutonium components, or "pits," are now
stored at Pantex because of problems at the Rocky Flats Plant
in Colorado, where pits were processed.
</p>
<p> What to do with the plutonium pits has not been resolved.
DOE plans to continue storing pits at Pantex until it decides
the final fate of the roughly 50 metric tons of plutonium that
will be removed from warheads during the next several years.
</p>
<p> Since pits can be reused directly in weapons, either by the
host government or a terrorist (or other unauthorized) group,
pits must be stored in a safe and strategically stabilizing
manner. One option is to alter the pits enough (either by
slight deformation or contamination with an epoxy) so that they
would have to be chemically processed to be reused. Even so,
pits have been traditionally processed by the U.S. for use in
new weapons. As the need for this activity is greatly reduced,
the U.S. should declare that the nuclear material from surplus
weapons will not be reused in weapons. Russia has reportedly
agreed not to reuse its nuclear material from retired weapons
in new ones, but to store it at sites subject to international
monitoring, if the U.S. agrees to similar constraints.
</p>
<p>More openness needed
</p>
<p> Continued unverified dismantlement could have a negative
effect on future arms reductions. The further dismantlement
goes, the greater the unknowns will become--How many weapons
have been destroyed? How many weapons were there to begin with?
How many weapons are left? How much nuclear material is there
and how much has been removed from weapons? What will become of
it? These uncertainties are likely to grow as arsenals decline.
</p>
<p> Adequate verification can give both sides better assurances
about how many weapons are destroyed. This would establish a
baseline of confidence from which the U.S. and the C.I.S. could
pursue even deeper cuts their in nuclear arsenals. Moreover, an
early emphasis on verification could prevent misunderstandings
of weapons capability and intent in the event of a political
reversal in the former Soviet republics.
</p>
<p>A project of The Tides Foundation, May 1992
</p>
</body>
</article>
</text>